REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	AUG 1990	FINAL

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
THE SOVIET VIEW OF FUTURE WAR

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
DAVID M. GLANTZ

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE
ATTN: ATZL-SAS
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-5015

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

AD-A232 785

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

DTIC FILE COPY

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

Surveys contending Soviet views on the nature of future war as a major ingredient in the formulation of future Soviet military strategy.

14. SUBJECT TERMS	15. NUMBER OF PAGES
FUTURE WAR, SOVIET GENERAL STAFF	18
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	

THE SOVIET VIEW OF FUTURE WAR

SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE

Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas

88-1455



THE SOVIET VIEW OF FUTURE WAR

Colonel David M. Glantz
Soviet Army Studies Office
U.S. Army Combined Arms Command
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

August 1990

The Soviet View of Future War

A major reality Soviet military planners must contend with in formulating a future military strategy is the nature of future war in general and the traditional concept of the initial period of war in particular. The General Staff, the institution traditionally entrusted with this task, has always experienced difficulty projecting thirty years into the future. The difficulty, however, has not been with developing an accurate image of future war, for, in fact, as the experiences of the 1920s and 1930s have indicated, Soviet theoretical concepts were quite visionary. Instead, the General Staff has found it difficult to translate that vision into reality. They readily imagined the technology and force structures required to exploit their vision, but could not develop them quickly enough. Today that traditional dilemma is even more serious, for, in fact, the General Staff is having difficulty engaging in the traditional process of foresight and forecasting with any degree of surety. Compounding that dilemma are the increasing problems Soviet industry is experiencing in developing and fielding new technology. It is the technical realm of future war that confounds and frustrates Soviet military theorists, for they know the nation they serve is increasingly unable to respond to their needs.

Today the Soviets face two dichotomies resulting from their attempts to analyze future war: the first dealing with who is doing the analysis and the second with the results of the analyses themselves. The General Staff and its supporting research organizations, the traditional source of truth on future war, have been challenged by the political and social scientists and economists of civilian academic institutes, whose institutniki now also study the subject of war (based on the judgement that war and its consequences are too great to be left to military men). The General Staff view represents continuity in Soviet military thought, and their views of future war are somewhat consistent with those that they held in the 1970s and early 1980s. They recognize the impact of technological changes on war, but generally reject the idea that war is now inconceivable.[1]

The General Staff has argued that, although the risk of global war tends to deter political-military action in peacetime, fundamentally new weaponry is creating completely new forms of combat. The six key elements of Soviet General Staff assessments are:

1) the initial period of war;
2) the likely intensity and scale of combat;
3) the means (weaponry) to be employed;
4) the consequences for the USSR economy and population;
5) the duration of war;
6) the influence of U.S and NATO doctrine on "reasonable sufficiency."[2]

In their view, Soviet ground forces' "defensive" operations would not be defensive to the end of a war; rather they would act "decisively" if the enemy did not cease operations immediately. This seems to be consistent with recent Soviet declarations of defensiveness, but the "character of modern war," which they then describe suggests a picture of warfare rather different from that postulated by the proponents of defensivism (the institutniki). The General Staff view postulates:

> -- extremely high intensity operations that would be dynamic and take place at a high tempo;
> -- broad global extent, including operations in space;
> -- extremely destructive combat, more so than ever before;
> -- high expenditure of resources, particularly to seize and maintain the initiative;
> -- ochagovyy boy [fragmented combat]. Disappearance of the "front line" or "first echelon," so that traditional terms like Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT), or of enemy troops (FLET) are no longer meaningful. Rather "zones of combat," up to 100 kilometers wide and deep would be created;
> -- no country or area would be safe from enemy action, as no "deep rear" [glubokiy tyl] would exist;
> -- strategic goals would be achieved through combined arms operations; no particular weapons systems could be singled out as having overwhelming significance;
> -- the destruction of nuclear and chemical plants during the course of a war, whether nuclear or conventional, would be a disaster. The shadow of Chernobyl' is clearly dominant here;
> -- nuclear war could liquidate the world's population.[3]

On the other hand, the institutniki argue the folly of war as Andrey Kokoshin stated in November 1988:

> Nowadays, at a time when the idea is taking root that war can no longer serve as a rational means of politics (at least not in Soviet-American relations, between the WTO and NATO), the need for the highest state and political leadership to know the fundamentals of military strategy, operational plans, the functioning of the military mechanism of carrying out decisions and so on, has by no means been eliminated. On the contrary, it is increasing. This is because decisions made at the boundary between politics and strategy may have fatal and irreversible consequences.[4]

In a major article published in December 1988, General G. I. Salmanov presented a classic view of modern war in the language of the General staff:

What, then, is new in the make-up of Soviet military doctrine, and how is it reflected in the nature of modern war?

In the first place -- it is the reinforcement and accentuation of its defensive orientation....

Defense in the initial period of a war is now regarded, not only as a means of bleeding the enemy with comparatively fewer forces, as a means of stopping him as quickly as possible and creating the necessary conditions for active counteroffensive action, but also as a means, and this is most important, of making the enemy think over and over again [mnogo raz podumat'] before he decides to attack in the first place. In individual TVDs, defense can also be used to inflict prolonged delay on the enemy with comparatively small forces on previously prepared sectors.

At the present time, one must take issue with those who assert, that with approximate parity of forces within the TVD, and with the sophistication of modern reconnaissance, the deployment of forces by an aggressor in, for example, Europe, is a chimaera. Defending this opinion, they quite reasonably assert that an aggressor can decide on an attack only if he will attain important strategic aims (for example, attaining the state frontier of the USSR) as a result of the first strategic operation.

To attain such an objective the aggressor would have to have a three- or four-to-one superiority in forces on main axes (and it is impossible not to agree with this). Evidently, to build up such a superiority secretly before the start of a war would hardly seem possible.

All this is true, if you do not consider a completely new qualitative improvement in the enemy's firepower, the sharply increased mobility of his shock grouping and what he recognizes as the main means of unleashing war -- the surprise attack.

Even with a roughly equal balance of forces before the start of military action, the enemy, having started the war by surprise, will attempt to shift this balance in his favor on individual directions. Evidently, such a situation can be attained during an air-land operation with the use of powerful fire strikes [ognevoy udar] on corridors through our combat formations and by rapid insertion of strong groupings from mobile enemy infantry units, large scale air assaults (desant), army aviation, specially trained diversionary and reconnaissance detachments (groups), and so on. The activity of these groups, evidently, will unfold with their flanks covered by unbroken fire. The bringing up of our reserves will be impeded by deep

fire strikes undertaken by aviation and long-range high-precision weapons.

Many might consider such a variant of the course of events as fantastic. But if we are not prepared for it in every way, this fantasy could become a terrible reality.[5]

Salmanov then underscored the central issue preoccupying the General Staff today, that of technology, stating:

In modern conditions, special timeliness and relevance [aktual'nost'] is accorded to those assets able to oppose new enemy weapons, which they plan to introduce into their armed forces during the next 10 to 15 years. It is very important to find answers in time, which will guarantee reduction in the effectiveness of enemy land, air and sea-launched high-precision weapons, low-power lasers, designed to blind people and put observation instruments and sights out of action, radar-absorbent coverings, which can significantly reduce the effectiveness of our air defenses in combating tactical aircraft, and so on.

...it is necessary to pay special attention to achieving reliable cover for second echelons, reserves, and also [logistic] targets in the rear against strikes by enemy aviation and high-precision weapons during the course of an air-land operation by them.[6]

This systematic General Staff study of the nature of future war has noted the emergence of new factors and influences which may alter traditional frameworks for planning, conducting, and studying war. Technological changes, such as development of high-precision weapons, electronic warfare systems, new heliborne systems and forces, and even space weapons and weapons whose nature and effects cannot now be imagined can challenge the traditional linear nature of war, and in so doing require redefinition of the geographical content of war (theaters, TVDs, and types of axes [directions -- napravleniye]), and the nature of missions and objectives. In essence, war is becoming multi-dimensional or, in the General Staff's language, "ochagovyy" -- a war without front lines.

Given these profound changes, General Staff analysts are accepting some of the arguments for defensiveness as mandated by political authorities and argued for by the institutniki. Beginning in 1985, the Soviets designated a new period in military development, soon defined within the context of a recast military doctrine emphasizing "defensiveness" in its political component, but clearly shaped in many of its military-technical aspects by reassessments which had begun during the previous decade.[7] Soviet analysts A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov have publicly advanced four strategic variants (or models), couched

analogously in historical terms, distinguished by the relative offensiveness or defensiveness of each, and other analysts have begun to postulate several additional paradigms as new political realities emerge.[8] It is likely the debate over strategy and changing political conditions will continue to ensure that the strategic realm will remain a topic of uncertainty and redefinition. Quite naturally each model is subject to interpretation.

On a scale of decreasing offensiveness, the four original Soviet models proposed by Kokoshin and Larionov are:

-- opposing coalitions possessing strong, offensively-oriented force groupings, which intend to conduct operations on enemy territory. Mutual offensive intent and suspicion of their opponent's motives characterize contending parties in this model, which replicates pre-First World War Europe, and, in the Soviet view, the Cold War as well. More important, this model inevitably increases the likelihood of nuclear warfare;

-- the Kursk model for premeditated defense, which postulates one side absorbing a major enemy blow and then delivering a decisive counteroffensive that carries into enemy territory.[9] Although labelled by the Soviets as "defensive," circumstances surrounding the Kursk operation underscore its inherently offensive nature. For this reason, Soviet theorists have recently turned away from the Kursk model as an example of future defensiveness to another which seems more appropriate;

-- the Khalkhin-Gol model of 1939 operations against the Japanese, and United Nations operations in Korea (1951-1953) now seem more appropriate to today's doctrinal pronouncements.[10] This model postulates that each side possesses the capability of routing an enemy force on its own territory but is not capable of penetrating enemy territory. Close examination of the circumstance at Khalkhin-Gol, however, indicate other facets of the operation which make it less relevant. These include the secret Soviet force build-up prior to the operation, which accorded the Soviets considerable surprise, Soviet numerical advantage, and political circumstances associated with the German threat to the Soviet Union, which restrained the Soviets at Khalkhin-Gol.

The Soviets also cite the period 10 June 1951 to 21 July 1953 of the Korean War as representative of this model. During that period warring parties tacitly agreed not to cross a certain demarkation line and not to expand the scale of military operations. Here, difficulties in determining the territorial limits of combat, compensation for losses and degree of restraint on both sides cloud the model's utility;

-- opposing coalitions, possessing only limited tactical capabilities, both of which are unable to undertake any operations of strategic consequence.[11] This model addresses relative capabilities and falters on the amorphous definition of defensive adequacy or, in current parlance, "sufficiency." It implies war is considered imminent by neither side, and there is a degree of mutual agreement among opposing parties regarding how "limited tactical capabilities" are defined.

The General Staff find the four paradigms for a defensive strategy useful but incline to support the Kursk or Khalkhin Gol variants. As defenders of and advocates for military truth (and, to an increasing extent, political and social order as well as Russian tradition), the General Staff cannot permit itself to become transfixed by "defensiveness," which may be driven more by political and economic realities than by objective military factors.

What sort of synthesis can result from these dichotomous views? Certainly any synthesis must recognize political, economic, and social realities as well as military ones. While any reasonable and prudent military assessment argues for the validity and utility of Kokoshin's and Larionov's second and third paradigms (those of Kursk and Khalkhin Gol), political realities associated with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe spell the demise of the Soviet Union's forward defense strategy, as well as of the older concept of an offensive theater-strategic operation. What remains will probably be some version of a bastion paradigm for defense of the Soviet Union, based on the one hand upon the Kursk or Khalkhin Gol paradigms, and on the other by Soviet experiences in the interwar years. It is this stark fact that compels Soviet analysts to thoroughly study the 1920s and 1930s, times when a bastion strategy was operative. The only question which then remains is the degree to which traditional General Staff analysis will continue to govern the manner in which the Soviets shape their strategy to the requirements of future war.

As an adjunct to this study of future war, the Soviets are obliged to continue their study of the nature and impact of initial periods of war. The most recent published judgements are refinements of General S. P. Ivanov's major work on the subject, published in 1974, and subsequent articles written through the mid-1980s.[12] By the mid-1980s these theorists had identified the following tendencies characterizing contemporary, and likely future, initial periods of war:

Tendencies in the Initial Period of War

-- Increased importance of the initial period due to massive use of new means of armed conflict

-- Increased influence of the results of the initial period on the subsequent course and outcome of hostilities
-- Enlarged scale of military operations
-- Increased use and importance of surprise
-- Shortened duration because of improved weaponry
-- Enhanced role and importance of maneuver

While Soviet theorists earlier stressed the necessity for gaining the initiative, ostensibly through offensive action, since 1987 their emphasis has been on defense during an initial period of war. Salmanov's declaration, cited earlier, emphasized the utility of defense during the initial period as a deterrent to war in the first place, as well as a prelude to counterattacks.

In Salmanov's view, "The new doctrinal approach to the interrelationship of offensive and defense, and the extraordinary importance of effective preparedness to conduct the first defensive operations of the initial period of war," urgently dictate the following measures be taken to insure success in an initial period of war:[13]

1) special efforts in preparing forces for their organization, deployment, and successful fulfillment of missions to repel aggression, whether conventional or nuclear, in particular, well-organized razvedka [intelligence] to prevent surprise attack;
2) maintenance of a well-prepared and protected (in advance) defensive grouping capable of increasing its combat preparedness commensurate with an enemy build-up for an attack. Thus:

> Our peacetime grouping and especially the first strategic echelon must be prepared, in the event of enemy attack, to conduct first defensive operations, independently and without reinforcement, and to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the depths of [its] territory, and to create conditions for successful conduct of subsequent operations to destroy him.[14]

3) creation in a short period of time of a system of fire which can deal with an enemy attack, and particularly his second echelon - - and immediately achieve fire and air superiority. (This involves anticipation of enemy technological achievements in the next 10 to 15 years);
4) protection of one's own second echelon, reserves, and critical rear area objectives. "In these conditions, defense proves to be not only a means and capability of repelling an enemy invasion, but also

> creating the prerequisites for seizing the initiative and conducting successful subsequent operations to destroy him." Defense must be active and strong because "it is very important...not to permit losses of a considerable portion of [one's] territory."[15]

Salmanov once again underscored the deterrent value of such a strategy, stating

> The logic of military-political thought is such that an enemy, reflecting on our preparation and constant readiness to repel aggressors rapidly and by the firmness, activeness, and power of our defense, will think more than once over the well-known truth, which says that 'to begin war is simpler than to end it.'[16]

Numerous Soviet theorists have joined with Salmanov in studying the initial period of war, using as a principal vehicle the experiences of June 1941. All have reinforced his conclusions. These recently published Soviet analyses on the initial period of war correspond, in their general description of the nature of combat, to similar studies written through 1985. When addressing the particular theme of offense vs defense, the recent studies accord with Soviet declarations of defensiveness promulgated since 1987. In this sense these descriptions directly relate to Kokoshin's and Larianov's Kursk and Khalkhin Gol paradigms. The main thrust of all this literature, however, directly relates to the single most notable case where a "defensive" strategy failed, that is in June 1941.

Traditionally, the Soviets have analyzed future conflict on an ideological basis and have defined a spectrum of wars among capitalist states or between capitalist and socialist states, which were the inevitable result of dialectical contradictions. This relatively neat framework, which has persisted from the 1920s through the Cold War, ostensibly still exists today. The essentially ideological approach has provided context for identifying types of war, assessed the likelihood of their occurrence, and identified the most probable scenarios for the outbreak of war. Moreover, ideological imperatives have, to a large extent, undergirded the solution of all other strategic questions, such as determining strategic posture, specifying the geographical limits of conflict (TVD), and defining the role of fronts, war planning, and force generation.

Today, as the importance of ideology withers, many of the ideological assumptions are also being questioned. This has led the civilian institutnik Kokoshin and the military theorist General V. N. Lobov to cautiously state:

> A qualitatively increased level of interdependence has changed the nature of the struggle of capitalist states

for a market and sources of raw materials -- it has become different than it was, not only between the two world wars, but also during the first postwar decades. Most significant in this respect is the policy of Japan, which does not possess many types of raw materials (beginning with energy resources) and is significantly inferior to other capitalist states in military power.

When assessing the military-political situation in the world, we do not fully take into account the fact that today's bourgeois-democratic regimes in the leading capitalist countries, even if conservative governments are in power, differ sharply from the extreme right-wing regimes of the likes of Hitler or Mussolini. To this day, in assessing the likelihood of war, some of our scientists virtually do not take into consideration either these differences or the fact that the results of World War II had a profound effect on the social consciousness in the majority of developed capitalist states. Of course, this does not rule out the need to be constantly aware of the activities and the scale of influence of various extremist groups and organizations on the masses and the governments. They are capable of changing the political, and through it the military-political, situation.

The nature of the military-political interrelations between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO has changed noticeably, the international situation has become less tense, and the immediate danger of aggression has decreased; however, the threat of war remains. Consequently, vigilance is necessary; it is necessary to know how the armed forces of the United States, NATO, and a number of other states are developing.[17]

This softening of the ideological content of Soviet policy has contributed to prospects for arms control and lessened the likelihood of either general nuclear war or European-wide conventional war. It has also increased the need for further study of previous strategic "truths." Kokoshin, Lobov, and others, suggest that study of the 1920s is an appropriate approach in the search for answers:

> Now, when these problems of the theory of strategy, the art of war as a whole, and limiting and reducing armed forces and arms are being widely discussed, it is important to consider them in a historical context and turn to the forgotten or half-forgotten works of Soviet politologists and military theorists of the 1920s and early 1930s, a prominent place among whom belongs to A. A. Svechin.[18]

Complicating this new approach to formulating strategy is the fact that the Leninist explanation of colonial war between imperialist powers and oppressed colonial states is also subject to doubt:

> One should bear in mind that the period of the struggle by colonial and dependent countries for national liberation has, to a considerable extent, ended in the traditional sense. More and more conflicts are taking place among developing countries themselves, which are in the stage of forming their own national and multinational (multi-tribe) statehood. The scale of the use of military force in this zone is not decreasing, and is increasing for a number of parameters. The process of devaluating the role of military force here has not yet begun, so the question of just and unjust wars must be largely resolved anew.[19]

This fact increases the need to study local wars, both for their political content as it affects socialist and capitalist great powers and for their military content, since war between great powers has become less frequent.

Kokoshin and Lobov also cast doubt on the continued utility of studying the experience of the last major world conflict, which to date has provided the basis for much Soviet military analysis:

> The experience of the Great Patriotic War, illuminated with considerable distortions, given all its unquestioned value and given all the outstanding achievements of our military art, was often made absolute. This interfered with full-scale consideration of the increasingly new political, economic, scientific and technical, operational-strategic factors which, following World War II, fundamentally changed, using A. A. Svechin's expression, the "strategic landscape." These factors included, above all, nuclear weapons, as well as the evolution of conventional weapons, a different appearance of local battlefields and the use of military force not only on the battlefields, but also for direct and mediated political influence.[20]

The last major anomaly in the classic Marxist-Leninist framework for articulating military strategy is the growing tendency for conflict within the socialist camp:

> The armed conflicts of the postwar decades between socialist states -- the USSR and the PRC, the PRC and the PRV -- have also not been studied. Conclusions and

> recommendations which could completely preclude such conflicts in the future have not been formulated sufficiently clearly.[21]

The existence of these conflicts demonstrates the extent to which previously held assumptions are becoming invalid. Soviet theorists are considering all of these factors as they attempt to translate threat assumptions into a military strategy for the 1990s.

All of these developments will also affect future Soviet typology of war, which, although now unclear, may include the following:

1) wars among capitalist states;
2) wars between capitalist states and socialist states;
3) wars among socialist states;
4) wars among developing states;
5) wars between capitalist states and developing states;
6) ethnic or religious struggles within states.

While inevitable struggles between large capitalist and socialist coalitions and between imperialist powers and a unified proletariat of underdeveloped states (revolutionary wars) have diminished, and with this the specter of inevitable cataclysmic struggle, the prospect for an increased number of "classic" conflicts among competing nations and smaller local wars has increased. In short, large wars of limited frequency may now be replaced by smaller wars of much greater frequency. This tendency accords with historical reality, which tells us that when great "concerts" of nations, such as existed during the Cold War, erode, international relations become more complex until a new "concert" is formed. Today, we seem to be entering such a period.

The altered and still-evolving Soviet view of future war, in conjunction with the seemingly lessened role of ideology, is impelling major changes in the policies of the Soviet state. Change is already evident in the related realms of military policy and military doctrine. In the future, new Soviet views concerning future war will likely produce equally striking changes in Soviet military strategy, strategic posture, and operational and tactical concepts.

ENDNOTES

1. For a superb study of how the Soviets approach future war in an historical and contemporary sense, see Christopher Bellamy, Soviet Future War, 2 vols., (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1990).

2. Ibid., 51. The source is referred to as a "confidential discussion." It does, however, match the traditional Soviet approach followed in earlier periods when the General Staff analyzed future war.

3. Ibid. This reflects the contents of G. I. Salmanov, "Sovetskaya voyennaya doktrina i nekotoryye vzglyady na kharakter voyny i zashchitu sotsializma" [Soviet military doctrine and some views on the nature of war and the defense of socialism], Voyennaya Mysl' [Military thought, hereafter cited as VM], No. 12 (December 1988), 7-20; see almost identical concerns expressed in A. Kokoshin, A.Konovalov, V. Larionov, V. Mazing, Problems of Ensuring Stability with Radical Cuts in Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments in Europe, (Moscow: Institute of USA and Canada Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1989).

4. A. Kokoshin, "Alexander Svechin on War and Politics," International Affairs, No. 11 (November 1988), 121.

5. Salmanov, 9-10.

6. Ibid., 10-11.

7. This assessment, for example, appeared in connection with a review of A. Babakov, Vooruzhennyye Sily SSSR posle voyny (1945-1986) [The Armed Forces of the USSR after the war (1945-1986)], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987) in V. G. Reznichenko, "Sovetskiye vooruzhennyye sily v poslevoyennyy period" [Soviet armed forces in the postwar period], Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil [Communist of the armed forces] (January 1988), 86-88.

8. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "Protivostoyaniye sil obshchego naznacheniya v kontekste obespecheniya strategicheskoy stabil'nosti" [The counterposition of general purpose forces in the context of strategic stability], Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya [World economics and international relations, hereafter cited as MEMO] (June 1988), 23-31. These have been widely discussed by Western analysts, to include a number of forums with Western, Soviet, and East European participation.

9. Considerable Western interest in the "Kursk model" was generated by the A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov article entitled "Kurskaya bitva v svete sovremennoy oboronitel'noy doktriny" [The Kursk battle in light of contemporary defensive doctrine], which

appeared in the August 1987 issue of MEMO. Numerous other Soviet analyses of Kursk have appeared prior to and since publication of this article.

10. Kokoshin and Larionov, "Protivostoyaniye," 27.

11. "Soviets Shifting Military Strategy," The Kansas City Times, 11 March 1989, p. A9, which quotes testimony of A. A. Kokoshin in March 1989. Testimony before the U.S. Congress' House Armed Services committee.

12. Extensive Soviet analysis of this theme of initial period of war has produced many studies, including S. P. Ivanov, Nachal'nyy period voyny" [The initial period of war], (Moscow; Voyenizdat, 1974); M. Cherednichenko, "O nachal'nom periode Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Concerning the initial period of the Great Patriotic War], Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal [Military-historical journal, hereafter cited as VIZh], No. 4 (April 1961), 28-35; P. Korkodinov, "Fakty i mysli o nachal'nom periode Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Facts and ideas about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War], VIZh, No. 10 (October 1965), 26-34; V. Baskakov, "Ob osobennostyakh nachal'nogo perioda voyny" [Concerning the peculiarities of the initial period of war], VIZh, No. 2 (February 1966), 29-34; A. Grechko, "25 let tomu nazad" [25 years ago], VIZh, No. 6 (June 1966), 3-15; I. Bagramian, "Kharakter i osobennosti nachal'nogo perioda voyny" [The nature and peculiarities of the initial period of war], VIZh, No. 10, (October 1981), 20-27; V. Matsulenko, "Nekotoryye vyvody iz opyta nachal'nogo perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Some conclusions from the experience of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War], VIZh, No. 3 (March 1984), 35-42; A. I. Yevseyev, "O nekotorykh tendentsiyakh v izmenenii soderzhaniya i kharaktera nachal'nogo perioda voyny" [Concerning some tendencies in the changing form and nature of the initial period of war], VIZh, No.11 (November 1985), 11-20.

13. Salmanov, 10.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 11.

16. Ibid.

17. Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvideniye" [Foresight], Znamya [Banner], No.2 (February 1990), 182.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 181. This questioning of the validity of Second World War experience echoes similar questioning by Soviet military theorists in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when they argued that the nuclear revolution (the revolution in military affairs) had negated the value of older forms of war. By 1962, however, theorists began having second thoughts, and they ultimately rejected the "single nuclear option" in favor of studying and preparing for both nuclear and conventional operations. See G. H. Turbiville, Jr., G. D. Wardak, ed., The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy, Vol. I, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1989), 26-27.

21. Ibid., 182.